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MORAL RULES AND EXCEPTIONS 
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Andrews University 
In a moral system, rules are often confronted by exceptions. In 
fact, an exception presupposes the existence of a rule, for lcjgical 
necessity calls for a context of requirement before one can speak 
meaningfully about an exception. But the reverse statement, that a 
rule presupposes an exception, is more problematic. Christian 
ethical theorists have long struggled with this latter proposition 
and with related questions. Can rules and exceptions, for instance, 
coexist in some sort of friendly competition? Or are they mutually 
exclusive? And is there a possibility of having "exceptionless" 
moral rules? 
The task of this essay, which explores this basic area of ethical 
concern, is twofold. First, I look at moral discourse from the angle 
of the relation between moral rules and their exceptions. In this 
connection I suggest four possible alternative relations between the 
two. My purpose is not to discover one best relationship, but rather 
to identify conditions as well as reasons for setting up exceptions 
and for accepting or rejecting the use of them. 
Second, I provide rationale for the thesis that the admission of, 
and resistance to, exceptions has an impact (good or bad) on the 
rule, at least on the level of the attitude of the moral agent. L. G. 
Miller indicates that rules are not affected by exceptions inasmuch 
as exceptions are not directed at rules but rather at moral 
judgments.' However, if moral judgments are affected, the result 
with respect to rules is very significant indeed, since moral rules 
and moral judgments can be kept completely separated only in 
theory, not in factual reality and practice. 
'L. G. Miller, "Rules and Exceptions," Ethics 46 (July, 1956): 269. 
1. Some Preliminary Considerations 
Before we consider alternative answers to our basis query, a 
few preliminary considerations are in order. First of all I define my 
use of the terms "rules" and '"moral rules." Next I deal with the 
contrast between "exceptions" and "excuses." And then, as the final 
preliminary consideration, I describe the dynamic and relationships 
that are involved in connection with rules and exceptions to them. 
Moral Rules 
In ethical literature the term "rule" is used in a variety of 
ways. It sometimes signifies a general and generic category in 
distinction from, but also often inclusive of, such more limited or 
specific concepts as "action," "value," "ends," etc. When ethicists 
speak of rule-utilitarianism and act-utilitarianism or of rule ethics 
versus situation ethics, the word "rule" includes all rules, whether 
these are general principles or whether they are specific rules of 
action. 
On the other hand, the word "rule" may have reference to 
something very specific, as when it signifies a direct and specific 
requirement which enjoins more-or-less concrete action or inaction. 
In this case, a "rule" is a subspecies of a "principle" or "norm." It is 
what Paul Ramsey calls a "direct rule," or "defined-action rules" 
belonging to the more general "defined-action principle1? In the 
present essay, I use the term "moral rule" in the sense of the direct 
rule that enjoins a specific and concrete action. 
Infrequent use and a somewhat ambiguous understanding of 
the word "exception" necessitates some clarification of this word as 
well. In general terms, an "exception" is defined as an instance or 
a judgment that does not conform to an established rule. It is "a 
particular case which comes within the terms of a rule, but to 
which the rule is not applicable.'" 
"Exceptions " and "Excuses" 
Some distinctions between "exceptions" and "excuses" may also 
prove helpful here. Whereas an "exception" refers to a rule in the 
'Paul Ramsey and G. H. Outka, eds., 'The Case of the Curious Exception," 
Norm and Context in Christian Ethics (New York: Scribner, 1969), 93. 
'The Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933), 3:373. 
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context of a moral judgment, decision, or dilemma, the most 
frequent antecedent for "excuse" is a specific action. If nothing is 
done, no excuses are in order. In fact, to seek for excuses at the 
level of decision-making or in confrontation with dilemmas prior 
to the consummation of an act is to open one's motives to 
suspicion. In other words, if I think of excuses before I act, this 
very fact may indicate my knowledge of the blameworthiness of 
the course of action I contemplate taking, and my desire to perform 
the act without being blamed. In short, excuses presuppose an 
ascription of responsibility.' 
Moreover, whereas the opposite of an exception is conformity, 
the opposite of an excuse is an accusation. If I am accused for 
having done action A, my alternatives are: (a) to admit having 
done the action, taking the consequences; (b) to deny the action; or 
(c) to seek excuses for the action. Alternative "(a)" is the opposite 
of alternative "(c)," for by admission of the action I do not seek to 
avoid the blame and consequences that are inherent in the 
accusation. The best solution here is simply to ask for forgiveness. 
By doing it, I do not need to put forth an excuse or even to present 
attenuating evidences; rather, I rest my case on mercy and 
compassion. With denial (alternative "b") on the other hand, I seek 
to show that the accusation itself is a mistake. This also contrasts 
with alternative "c," for when I resort to excuses I do not deny 
having done action A. Instead, I either (i) seek to justify the action 
and thus dismiss the blame, or (ii) plead for mitigation of 
responsibility on the basis of extenuating circumstances and thus 
diminish or even totally deny the blame. 
The call for an exception differs from all the above. When 
asking for it, not only do I admit the action which appears to 
conflict with the rule but prior to my taking that action also claim 
to have insights, arguments, and/or evidences on the basis of 
which I should be allowed either to circumvent the requirement of 
the rule or to modify the rule so as to fit my own unique case. In 
using this procedure, I assume responsibility for the action and for 
its consequences. 
4For helpful treatise on excuses, see David Holdcroft, "A Plea for Excuses," 
Philosophy 44 (Od. 1969): 314-330. 
The Dynamic of Conformity and Nonconfomity 
In the case of conformity to the rule, the responsibility for my 
action and for my status is not entirely mine. My situation rests on 
the authority standing behind the requirement. In view of this 
(1) the validity and trustworthiness of that authority is tested every 
time an action is performed in conformity to the rule, with future 
obedience also being either encouraged or discouraged; (2) my 
loyalty and the manner in which I conform become exposed to 
scrutiny; and (3) the validity and relevancy of the rule are put to 
trial, as well. If there are some features present or absent during 
my action, or as a consequence of it, these features indicate a flaw 
in either (I), (2), or (3), which may cause me to doubt the goodness 
or rightness of my action. Such features, insights, and/or evidences 
will alert me to a need for "exceptions to the rule" in my future 
behavior, or to the necessity for improving my moral reasoning, or 
to the need for rejecting the rule itself. 
Looking back at my action or my decision, I may choose to do 
nothing about my future conduct and simply rely on excuses. I 
would adopt the alternative (c) mentioned earlier, suppress the 
warnings, and resign myself to the rule (or its authority) without 
questioning. The danger I face with (c) is that (i) or (ii)-namely, 
seeking justification for the action, or pleading mitigation of 
responsibility for the action--could turn out to be merely an act of 
cowardice which stifles moral growth. If I opt for (a), the door is 
open for improvement, growth, and perhaps brave failures. If 
careful analysis of both (1) and ( 2 t t h e  validity and trust- 
worthiness of the authority behind the rule, and my own loyalty 
and manner of conformity to the rule-inspires confidence, the 
validity or relevancy of option (3) must be tested, for exceptions 
might be in order. Unlike the search for excuses, the endeavor to 
establish an exception may prove extremely challenging and 
helpful. Several factors could complicate my assignment, however. 
Among them are the consequences of modification, extreme 
hardship, threat to life, extreme conflict or ambiguity of norms with 
regard to them, my personal convictions or special theological 
insights, covenants, etc. 
2. Concepts Involved in the Call for Exceptions 
Some further pertinent concepts involved in a call for 
exceptions should be noted: 
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1. An exception always refers to a rule that applies to the 
particular case. If a rule does not apply, what is needed is not an 
exception, but rather another rule. 
2. Exceptions are sometimes called on the basis of some 
exempting conditions external to the rule? For instance, a rule which 
enjoins returning what is borrowed may be excepted if the 
borrower should suffer sudden tragedy and therefore is in no 
condition to return the borrowed item now or ever. The tragedy 
could not be anticipated and for that reason is outside of the rule. 
Thus it may be considered as a condition justifying an exception. 
3. At times exceptions are justified by so-called qualifying 
conditions In this case, qualifying conditions claim the power to 
produce modifications, enlargements, and perhaps enrichment of 
the original rule. For example, the rule which prohibits taking 
produce from my garden without my permission (this would be an 
act of stealing) can be modified under certain conditions. If my 
neighbor needs to feed her hungry family, and there are no other 
options other than to take some of my tomatoes, she may choose 
to help herself without telling me. As the owner of the produces, 
I have several options in such a case. I can prosecute this neighbor 
(the option is legally justified). Or I can interpret her poverty as an 
exempting condition and tolerate her act. Or, finally, I can come to 
realize my own failure to know of, or be sensitive to, my 
neighbor's destitution (and possibly to the needs of many other 
neighbors); thus modifying my rule of action by saying, "Do not 
steal my tomatoes, unless you must feed your hungry children"; 
thus the concept of Christian stewardship and obedience to the law 
of loving one's neighbor may urge me to justify an exception to the 
rule. The basic purpose of the rule has remained, but its meaning 
has been enriched? 
Moral situations are, however, never simple. Although an 
owner may call exception to the rule protecting his or her property, 
a neady neighbor should take care not to assume overly much. 
Stealing is, of course, a forgivable action, but a request or 
explanation may gain access to much more than a few tomatoes, 
and may do so at a lesser risk for all concerned. We may note in 
passing, that in this procedure the call for exceptions may at times 
5Ramsey and Outka, 87. 
%id. 
'bid., 89. 
stave off more difficult, but also more responsible, alternatives of 
action. In other words, in view of exempting conditions, it may be 
easier to take what is not mine and simply expecting the owner to 
be tolerant than to communicate the conditions and thus act with 
mutual agreement. 
4. At least one more reason for exceptions is often presented. 
Paul Ramsey calls it "faithfulness clnims.'* It is evident that a moral 
agent brings such claims into the moral decision. We all have our 
promises to keep and thus our God, our family, and our neighbors 
have laid claims on us. These claims can serve as the basis for a 
call for exceptions. For instance, it is conceivable that during World 
War I1 some military guards resisted even seemingly innocent 
gestures towards female prisoners of war due to the claims of their 
marriage covenant or to the requirements of the military code. The 
same would be true in the reverse direction too, of course, and 
undoubtedly in many other similar situations as well. 
3. The Relationship between Rule and Exception 
We are now ready to turn our attention to the alternative 
answers that may be given to our original questions concerning the 
relationship between rule and exception, and concerning the status 
of a rule which admits an exception. In exploring such answers, we 
must take note of the fact that it is possible to group the use of 
exceptions in moral decisions into four categories. These are: 
(A) exclusion of the rule, (B) exceptions in the rule, (C) exceptions 
to the rule, and (D) exclusion of exceptions. 
A. Exclusion of the Rule 
There are views which hold that exceptions are not made to 
a rule, but rather that rules themselves should be excepted. This, 
of course, poses a challenge to my earlier statement to the effect 
that an exception presupposes a rule. 
The existentialist approach, for instance, avoids rules as a basis 
for moral conduct. Instead, human creativity, freedom, and 
resourcefulness are trusted to inspire the moral agent, revealing the 
specific need in the situation and thus orienting the decision. In 
this approach, conformity to a rule is viewed as an inferior stance 
because it looks back at the rule for orientation. As C. Michalson 
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points out: 'The future is a more reliable guide simply because it 
does not tell us what to do, but appeals to us to invent or create in 
the light of the emerging situation.'" Thus, D. Bonhoeffer could 
say that a Christian should not be fettered by principle because, 
bound by the love of God, the Christian has been set free from the 
problems and conflicts of ethical decisions. The emphasis in the 
foregoing is obviously on the uniqueness of each individual and 
each situation. As a consequence, not one single rule can be found 
to prescribe or predict the direction or decision. 
The situationalism of Joseph Fletcher is not far, either, from 
this attitude towards rules. Although situationalists claim an 
unexceptionable norm as a foundation for their system, they deem 
that a&@ love is this absolute norm, whose task it is to correct 
legalism in ethics. Yet, while Joseph Fletcher carefully separates 
agap from sentimentalism and partiality,'' the very absoluteness 
of this love as a single matchless norm opens opportunities for 
exceptions. Agap is inevitably both general in nature and remote 
from the rule of action, and thus it becomes very flexible as a 
norm. 
Two additional principles are utilized in justifying the call for 
exceptions in situationalism, and these bring it closer to the 
existentialist camp. The first declares that love's decision is made 
situationally, not prescriptively." Fletcher believes that in the heat 
of the situation the fears, pressures, hopes, guilts, and limitations 
will not cloud the mind of the moral agent. We can wonder 
whether the absence of particular commitments to some foreseeable 
sort of action in a foreseeable kind of situation would not provide 
a more secure and consistent moral conduct. 
The main problem with this is that love itself may be 
excepted. On the other hand, as experience seems to show, when 
love becomes a commitment in terms of action, when it is 
safeguarded within specific covenants of relationship with God and 
humans, then the risk of love itself being excepted is greatly 
reduced. In this case, the action born out of a love which has 
planned ahead provides a firmer ground, especially if the situation 
takes the form of temptation. 
9C. Michalson, "Existentialist Ethics," in Westminster Dictionary of Christian 
Ethics, ed. J. F. Childers and J. MacQuarrie (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1986), 218. 
''Joseph Fletcher, Situation Ethics: the Nau Morality (Philadelphia: Westminster, 
1966)) 113. 
The second principle is exemplified by Fletcher's urging us to 
let love justify an~thing.'~ This brings in another set of problems, 
for means must be considered even when love is the end of an 
action. In his excellent critique of Fletcher's point in this regard, 
Paul Ramsey shows that there are other criteria for justifying the 
means besides their usefulness in achieving ends. For example, 
means must conform to natural rights or natural justice. Cruel 
forms of punishment must never be used for the sake of any end, 
no matter how good that end.'3 He warns that the price paid by 
consequentialism is "the reduction of the moral life and the very 
humanum of men to the possibility of being used as instruments 
only."'4 
It is this reduction of humanness, of relationships, and of 
covenants to mere instrumentalism that threatens agapz and ushers 
in exceptions. Unarmed, uncommitted, and unprepared in terms of 
a particular action of love, the moral agent is totally absorbed and 
fascinated by the end, often forgetting the means to that end. The 
rules which safeguard marriage or property rights, for example, 
may then be excepted if an end requires it. Any rule or any right 
is a potential candidate for being overruled and replaced by an 
exception. The example of the rule regulating marriage and divorce 
as interpreted by the school of Hillel is a possible illustration of 
this approach to exceptions. In this interpretation, the rule of 
fidelity could be set aside by the husband for even trivial reasons, 
so that in effect it was mot the rule that guided, but rather that 
exceptions regulated the conduct. 
B. Exceptions in the Rule 
In distinction from the previous position, which hesitates to 
prescribe moral conduct, the approach of "exceptions within the 
Rule" gives rules a more fundamental role. The relationship 
between rule and exception is not that of dominance of one over 
the other, but rather that of synthesis that is to say, the exception 
modifies, alters, broadens, or enriches the rule. 
The first concern in this case is what to do with qualifying 
conditions. Extreme hardship (such as suffering), direct conflict of 
I3Paul Ramsey, Deeds and Rules in Christian Ethics (New York: University 
Press of America, 1983), 185. 
"Ibid. 
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norms or values, utility, pima farie conviction that one's duty to 
God and man stand at variance with the usual conformity to a 
particular rule, and so on, may create a dilemma. As stated by 
L. G. Miller, "If it is the case that each rule is usually to be 
followed but not always and that there is no way of telling when 
the questions about exceptions will arise and how they are to be 
resolved, then morality itself is left in a rather disorganized and 
confused state."15 
In order to bring coherence to ethical theory, a utilitarian 
suggests the prioritization of rules. If rule X normally applies and 
is now faced with qualifying conditions which generate exception 
Y, the first thing to do is to calculate which of the two--either X or 
XY-would result in the greatest good. If tomorrow rule X meets 
exception Z, then "calculus" must decide whether either X, XY, or 
XZ or even XYZ would bring the greatest good. Thus we end up 
with a hierarchy of rules that are all subordinated to and ranked 
by the general criterion of utility. The original rule X is modified 
or supplemented by rules XY, XZ, or XYZ. 
In such a situation the moral agent is faced with several 
challenges. For example, on what basis is a person to know 
whether X or XY will produce the greatest amount of good? How 
do we identify priority among such "good" things as intellectual 
development, spiritual growth, one's duty to keep promises, etc.? 
The criterion of utility is too vague and also too vulnerable to 
human finiteness and weakness to give it endorsement. In addition 
to that, as L. G. Miller reminds us, it is just not the case that where 
there are two rules one will always take precedence over the 
other? 
Finally, how do we stop exceptions from recurring? If Y is the 
exception to X and if Y refers to some qualifying conditions (like 
suffering), Y can have its own exception, and this in turn can have 
its own, and so on ad infiniturn. 
H. Sidwick suggests that the solution to the problem of ever- 
emerging exceptions can be resolved by listing all possible future 
exceptions." But how can we decide upon these, and how do we 
know that we have constructed a complete list? Without a new 
"H. Sidwick, The Methods 4 Ethics (London: Macmillan, l884), 311. 
criterion, the criterion of completeness, no one can be sure that any 
rule will remain secure and reliable. 
Furthermore, even an exhaustive listing of exceptions, were it 
possible, would neither provide an infallible criterion of ranking 
nor produce a series of rules. At best, what it would produce is a 
conjunction of rules. Such a conjunction or "joint assertion of a 
number of rules will not be a rule that can be used to resolve 
conflicts between the component  rule^.'"^ 
Utilitarianism with calculus and the utility criteria, together 
with prima facie principle, and other forms of hierarchialism 
wherein the rules are ranked as amended by exception, cast doubts 
on the reliability of the rule in its synthetic relations with 
exceptions." Solutions of this kind, even if inevitable, are not 
always reliable. We cannot always determine whether our original 
rule retains enough of its originality so as not to overly alter its 
applications and consequences, or whether the rule is modified to 
the extent that it becomes in reality another rule alongside the 
original one, perhaps even taking the front seat. 
Another way of limiting the proliferation of exceptions is to 
confine them to a family of rules. If X is the basic original rule of 
action and if exception y is applied to it, then we endeavor to limit 
the exception's influence only to Xy and not XY. If exception z is 
applied, the result is Xz. In that case, Xy and Xz are different rules, 
but both of them belong to the same genus x?' In this construct, 
modification of the rule is only partial, and only those exceptions 
are admitted which relate to that particular rule of action. And yet, 
even in this case we have no way of knowing whether we can 
predict or list all exceptions exhaustively, nor do we know how or 
why to prefer y to z. 
The difficulties of synthesis between rules and exceptions are 
reduced when qualifying conditions can be predicted with 
regularity. The case of the law concerning divorce as interpreted by 
the school of Shammai serves as an illustration. It is possible to 
affirm the rule of faithfulness to marriage vows and at the same 
time encompass the qualifying condition of "unchastity." The rule, 
then, is conditionally binding because unchastity is ipso facto a 
I9For further insights, see Miller's article. 
%. J .  Erickson, Relativism in Contempwary Christian Ethics (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Baker, 1974), 140. 
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justification for exception. The concept of faithfulness implies this 
caveat. 
But why should this be so? One might imagine that unchastity 
might be encouraged or even somehow caused by the "innocent" 
partner. Should we then be more careful so as to say that even 
when an exception of this kind is present, divorce is conditional on 
the total innocence of the other marriage partner? Here again we 
discover that the old problem of recurring exceptions emerges. The 
original rule is open to modification by means of exceptions, and 
thus that rule becomes conditionally binding, modified by ever- 
recurring exceptions. 
C.  Exceptions to the Rule 
Many Christians believe that human life, moral life included, 
stands within the authority of God. His will for humans is the very 
definition of moral good and moral duty. "He has shown you, 0 
man, what is good; and what does the Lord require of you" 
(Mic 6:s). This "showing" of the moral good and moral duty occurs 
primarily in Scripture. The words of wisdom (Proverbs, 
Ecclesiastes), of advice (Deut 30:15-29, Mat 5-7), of special 
commands (Isa 1:ll-18, Eph 5:25-32, Exod 20:l-17), and of examples 
(Heb 11:l-39,12:1-I), all show God's will for human moral conduct. 
The most reliable and clear revelation of moral good and moral 
duty is revealed in the life of Jesus Christ (1 Pet 2:21-25, John 
13:l-17, Phil 2:5-11). 
The effort of God's love to meet the human need for moral 
guidance motivates Christians to follow God's will gladly. As a 
result, God's wish or will becomes a rule for the Christian, and that 
rule enjoys preeminence over exceptions. Moral rules thus are not 
subject to abrogation or modification by an exception. 
Some characteristic features of this third alternative way of 
relating exceptions to rules should be noted: 
1. Exceptions are Accidental. True exceptions to a rule cannot be 
predicted nor regulated. A predictable exception (if in harmony 
with God's will) is just another rule. Even the exempting condition 
of unchastity in marriage is not a predictable event, otherwise no 
Christian would enter into a marriage covenant where adultery is 
foreseeable. And when it does occur, it should not be an ipso facto 
justification for the exception, i.e. divorce. Repentance and 
forgiveness can save the marriage, and the commitment to the 
covenant of faithfulness is affirmed above the exception. Moreover, 
each exception must be decided at face value in every case. 
2. Exceptions are Unique. M. J .  Erickson states that there "is 
something about the particular case under consideration that lifts 
it above the general rule. The case itself is so unique, however, that 
the exception-making rule cannot be generalized or extended to 
other cases. It applies to this case, and to it al~ne."~' 
"Thou shalt not kill" is a rule which calls for respect for 
human life. It is also an expression of God's will. In 1 Sam 15:3, 
however, the same God gives another command. This time his will 
is that the Israelites kill the Amalekites. Herein the decalogue 
commandment prohibiting murder seems to be modified so as to 
include this exception. 
There are, however, two other possibilities. Keeping in mind 
that the command to kill the Amalekites is "accidental" (that is, no 
one could have predicted nor expected such an order), we may 
consider that this command becomes separate from the decalogue 
commandment. It stands, not on the authority or validity of the 
decalogue commandment, but rather on God's expressed order. 
Thus, there is no relationship between the two commands, either 
contradictory or complementary. 
A second point of view would be to consider the command to 
kill the Amalekites as a unique command. It concerns this one 
situation and time, and it is given to Israel alone. The requirement 
is unique and very specific, and therefore it is an exception to the 
decalogue commandment. 
But if an exception must be so focused, specific, and accidental 
in order to qualify as an exception, how is it still an exception to 
the rule in question? Why not simply consider it as a totally new 
rule? Looking further at the characteristics of exceptions may 
provide an answer. 
3. Both the Rule and the Exception Refer to Some Related Value. 
Two rules which regulate two unrelated values cannot establish an 
exceptional relation. The sixth commandment and the command to 
kill the Amalekites both refer to the same value of human life, but 
they demand contrary actions. Recognition of one of the rules as 
specific and relative to a unique circumstance resolves the conflict 
and safeguards the proper validity of both requirements. The 
specific rule becomes an exception to the general rule whose 
function is to regulate the usual relation to that value. 
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4.  One of the Rules Should be a General Rule. Two specific and 
unique rules do not usually establish an exceptional relation. The 
order to kill the Amalekites is not an exception, nor is it related, for 
instance, to the command not to kill Cain (Gen 4:15). The two 
commands are very specific and both of them can independently 
entertain an exception or be related to a more general rule. 
5. The Rule and its Exception Proceed from the Same Authority. In 
the case of two requirements if one of them is according to divine 
will and the other comes from society or some other human 
authority, no call for exceptions is possible. The obligation to God 
takes precedence over one's duty to human beings (Acts 4:19), 
because the Christian's best behavior in inter-human relationships 
is contained in the will of God. 
6. Exceptions Require Extraordinary Situations. Sin and its tragic 
consequence of evil often bring overwhelming challenges to human 
will, faith, wisdom, and commitments. These are circumstances of 
conflicting ultimates (life-boat), or times when conformity requires 
non-existing resources (as in the advanced pregnancy of a young 
incest victim), to mention just a few. If an exception to the rule is 
introduced, it will be because, humanly speaking, this is the 
very last alternative. Rules in this approach are "virtually 
exceptionless.'" 
This approach must deal with several problems. For example, 
the moral agent is faced with uncertainty as to when the personal 
plight is extraordinary enough to justify an exception. God's will 
often leads human lives through unusual hardships. Was not this 
Job's experience? His wife and his friends judged his condition 
more than sufficiently tragic to require an exception. 
But, is the counsel of humans an adequate guide in moral 
matters? Some churches provide dogmas, canons, and even 
authoritative advice which indicate when and if an exception is 
warranted. If the church is perceived as God's infallible 
mouthpiece, such a solution makes sense. Yet, Job remained in 
agony in spite of the input he received. We see him stand as an 
individual responsible for his decisions and actions; the human 
input can only advise and react, it cannot decide for others. 
Experience seems to show that the extremity of a tragedy is a 
very hostile context for prescriptivism. Heroism and extraordinary 
courage defy requirement. Christians who relate rules and 
%chard Gula, What Are They Saying about Moral Noms? (New York: Paulist 
Press, 1982), 77-79. 
exceptions according to approach #3 must deal with the uncertainty 
of knowing when an exception is warranted, and this is in part 
what human freedom and responsibility mean. 
The danger, of course, is to consider only what is possible as 
required, what is unpleasant as exceptional, and what is 
challenging as unique. The threat of a "slippery slope" is a constant 
reality as soon as one tolerates exceptions. 
D. The Exclusion of Exceptiuns 
We finally turn our attention to a fourth way of relating rules 
to exceptions. Here, conformity to rules is so rigorous that it 
excludes all exceptions in every circumstance and at any place or 
time. This approach is based on several presuppositions. 
First of all, God is sovereign. The Scriptures teach that no 
other authority can successfully challenge his authority, no wisdom 
or power can equal his wisdom and power, and no will should 
take precedence over his will (Isa 40~26). The extremity of moral 
hardship cannot outdistance him, nor can the uniqueness of a 
moral dilemma surprise him to the point where humans must go 
it alone and claim exceptions. 
Second, God's will is perfectly good for humans; exceptions 
can add nothing good. Any system of ethics that presents a notion 
of good outside of the divine will as expressed in God's grace 
towards human beings "coincides exactly with the conception of 
sin. . . . "23 There can be no question of a positive recognition of 
Christian ethics by other systems or of an attachment of Christian 
ethics to them, because Christian ethics stands under the "final 
word of the original chairman.'" 
A third postulate affirms that God has claimed all human life. 
"No one has a claim on a man, or on a people, save God alone, and 
this claim permeates all relationships of life. It is the only valid 
norm." God and man are bound by a mutual covenant and for that 
reason their actions must reflect mutual loyalty? 
But obedience, it is claimed, is not a natural response to God's 
will. Since man wants above all to be like God, his way is "the war- 
path on which he has entered in opposition to God. Between God, 
=Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1957), vol. 2, part 2, 
518. 
25Emil Bnmner, The Divine Imperatiae (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1937), 54. 
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the eternally good, and man, the relationship might easily be one 
of scorn on the part of God and envy on the part of man. But it 
cannot be one of claim on the part of God and obedience on the 
part of man." 26 Obedience which does not come from divine 
grace will certainly fail and seek for exceptions in order to 
accommodate human weakness. 
Therefore, obedience is not a matter of preference, choice, or 
convenience, rather, it is a matter of faith? It is a response "to the 
God in whom we may believe;" God "who calls us in such a way 
that we must not only hear, but obey; who orders us in such a way 
that in all freedom we must recognize the force of His order 
.... 
1128 
The fourth postulate is that God's command is both urgent 
and stringent. It is urgent because it is the precondition of life 
itself.z9 Humans cannot be indifferent to it without jeopardizing 
their destiny. It is stringent because, being above man's spiritual 
life and beyond the realization of human reason or achievement, it 
gives no room for maneuvering?' Human action can be either that 
of obedience or disobedience. The decision of good and evil has 
been settled once and for all in the decree of God, in the cross and 
resurrection of Jesus Christ." By that divine choice, all human 
choices must be measured. "What right conduct is for man is 
determined absolutely in the right conduct of God."32 Christians 
cannot change it, nor should they go back on it and seek 
exceptions. 
The fifth premise concerns the nature of moral obligation. 
Barth insists that humans are destined to obedience to God's 
command of grace. Therefore, humans should not endeavor to give 
an answer to the moral question of what is good and what is right, 
but rather they are called to be that answer. The multifarious 
systems of ethics which seek to give answers to moral dilemmas are 
just a prolongation of our fallenness, because they presuppose the 
"Karl Barth, Ethics (New York: Seabury Press, 1981),102. 
2sBarth, Church Dogmatics, 556. 
"bid., 536. 
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possibility of an abstract and external knowledge of good and 
right. For Barth, obligation proceeds from a concrete divine 
command which confronts the moral agent directly. It is the work 
of sanctifying grace in Christ Jesus. Following Jesus, a Christian 
does not crave good conduct of and for himself or herself, but 
rather seeks to be the subject to God's grace, will, and command.33 
Here we touch a critical point of this approach to exceptions. 
Two questions are: How do we apprehend the command? And 
how do we know it is a divine command that we are considering? 
A personal encounter with God who confronts us is Barth's answer 
to the first question. The sense of obligation, the choice of action, 
the motivation for acting on that choice happen in the intimacy of 
the human self.  External prescriptions are only relative orien- 
tations even if they are found in the Bible. "Obviously neither the 
totality nor a selection of the biblical imperatives, nor any one of 
them is in itself the unconditioned concrete command that comes 
to you and me today." This is true for the Ten Commandments, 
Jesus' Sermon on the Mount, "or imperatives of the admonitory 
chapters of the epistles.''35 
But how do we discern between divine voice and the urges 
stemming from our human heart? Carl F. H. Henry argues that 
Barth's rejection of general revelation and the Bible as propositional 
communication of divine will opens the door for subjectivism and 
relativism? He advocates a Christian ethic that comes from 
objectively revealed  proposition^:^ in addition to the ministry of 
the Holy Spirit.)' Such propositions are known rationally as the 
divine "ought" which encompasses human moral life and gives it 
specific and practical dire~tion?~ In this way the danger of the 
subjectivist's vulnerability to exceptions is averted. 
It must be admitted, however, that either on the basis of direct 
divine encounter or by the mediation of rational revelation to 
human reason and will, the exception of all exceptions remains a 
%id., 517. 
"Ibid., 556,557. 
35Barth, Ethics, 81/82. 
Tar1 F. H. Henry, Christian Persom2 Ethics (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1973,196. 
37~bid., 257. 
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challenge for Christian moral life. If the former carries the threat of 
subjectivism, the latter is haunted by fallible human reason and by 
corrupted human will. To be a Christian means to listen, discern, 
search, and follow. It means to be watchful of assuming too much 
and believing too little. Discipleship is costly, as Bonhoeffer 
demonstrated. Total commitment and loyalty to God's will cannot 
be legislated, earned, or experienced passively. Exceptionless, 
loving conformity is the promise given by the One who is well able 
to bring it to completion. 
4 .  Conclusion 
The four approaches of relating exceptions to moral rules 
suggested here represent only four foci in the spectrum of 
alternatives. It is possible and even necessary to consider all 
available factors in order to create the most circumspect response 
to a moral requirement (either a rule or its exception). Identification 
and evaluation of conditions and reasons for opting for or against 
a rule or its exception is a necessary part of this process. 
In approach 1, the conditions which foster exceptions are 
human creativity, autonomy, freedom, relativity to the situation, 
and the ends sought. The reasons for calling for exceptions are the 
radical uniqueness of each situation and each individual, along 
with fear of legalism, together with rejection of it. 
Approach 2 views extreme hardship, conflict of norms and 
values, utility, and prim facie duties as some conditions under 
which exceptions may arise. One of the main reasons for excepting 
a rule may be the concept of the greatest good for the greatest 
number of persons, as in utilitarianism. 
In approach 3, exceptions are admitted only under the most 
stringent, singularly unique, and unpredictably new conditions. 
Therefore, it is hard to identify any consistent reason which could 
always justify an exception to a rule. 
Finally, approach 4 admits no conditions for exception. The 
basic reason for this absolute exclusion of exceptions is found in 
the origin and nature of moral rules. The origin of moral rules is 
in the perfectly good will of a sovereign God who has claim on all 
of human life. In this context, moral rules are both urgent and 
stringent in nature. They compel the moral agent to be the answer 
to the question of what is good and morally right. 
The foregoing survey of the various rule-exception correlations 
seems to confirm the claim that the concept of moral exceptions 
32 MIROSLAV M. 
varies with the way in which moral rules are viewed. In 
approaches 1 and 2, moral rules are either rejected or given a 
relative or conditional validity. It is here that exceptions enjoy 
legitimacy. In approach 3, on the other hand, as the concept of 
moral rules enjoys greater authority and universality, not only are 
exceptions more uncommon, they become more unusual and 
extraordinary. 
Furthermore, it appears that not all exceptions are conceived 
as identical. In approaches 1 and 2, exceptions may come 
dangerously close to being excuses. This is the case because the 
principle of utility and situational decision-making without any 
prior preparation and commitment proves too weak for affirming 
and maintaining the validity of a rule. As shown above in 
approach 3, exceptions are unusual and very extraordinary. 
All of this leads us to raise the question as to whether the 
admission of any exception (particularly if exception borders on the 
notion of excuse) leaves rules intact. Is not the introduction of an 
exception into moral discourse as significant as is the affirmation 
of a rule? Why would a moral rule be affected less by introduction 
of an exception than an exception would be weakened through 
affirmation of a rule? 
It appears that a rule which repeatedly resists an exception 
and an exception which persists against a rule become dominant at 
least on the level of the moral agent's attitude. I can see at least 
two reasons for this. First, human behavior is habit-forming. 
Resistance to something strengthens resistance, and compliance 
makes future compliance easier. Second, the moral conduct is open 
to influence and prompting from the outside. So, for example, the 
affirmation of the rule of loyalty to one's belief by John Huss 
(contrary to approach 1) in the face of extreme hardship (in 
divergence from approach 2), even if his case could be classified as 
singularly unique and thus justify an exception (approach 3), has 
inspired many to affirm the same rule. On the other hand, the 
denial by Jerome of Prague on September 11,1415, had an opposite 
impact on Christians that was not fully overcome by Jerome's 
affirmation of loyalty at the price of martyrdom one year later. 
Finally, we should be reluctant to declare where any 
individual stands on the rule-exception issue. An attempt to define 
this displays either ignorance or arrogance or both. Only God can 
accurately judge performance and preference. Sometimes in our 
attempt to elaborate a classification of moral conduct or moral 
reasoning with the purpose of bringing a better understanding of 
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that conduct and reasoning, we succumb to a temptation to classify 
people. James Gustafson has shown how extremely difficult and 
needless such an activity really is? 
For instance, it is not necessarily true that approaches 1 and 
4 stand in mutual contradiction. It is possible to believe that a 
perfect Moral Agent brings them together. If God's will (includ- 
ing revealed propositional scriptural statements) is internalized 
(Ps 40:9) so that autonomy and theonomy coincide perfectly, then 
no exceptions are needed or possible. Short of this, loving and 
exceptionless conformity to God's will is a promise realized only 
in Jesus Christ and through his grace realizable in us (Phil 1:6). 
'('James Gustafson, "Context Versus Principle, a Misplaced Debate in Christian 
Ethics," Hamard Theological Rmiew 58 (1 965): 171 -202. 
